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 Abstract 
The aim of this paper is: (i) to examine the determinants of default on bank loans for 
Romanian non-financial companies, (ii) to evaluate risks to financial stability stemming 
from the real sector – via the direct channel and (iii) to provide with a stress-testing 
framework that enables to investigate the impact of various macroeconomic variables on 
the probability of default. We find that trade arrears, interest burden and receivables cash 
conversion cycle are the most frequent determinants of default both at short term and 
long term horizon. We also develop two separate default models for large firms and 
foreign trade firms. We determine a measure of risk to financial stability – debt at risk – 
via the direct channel, by multiplying the estimated probability of default with the 
outstanding bank loans. Debt at risk is concentrated into above average risk firms, but 
risks to financial stability stemming from the real sector remain at a moderate level. 
Finally we propose some guidelines on how to build stress-testing scenarios that enables 
to analyze the impact of various macroeconomic shocks on the probabilities of default. 
We find that non-financial firms are resilient to potential interest rate shocks, which is 
consistent with the fact that firms finance their activity through bank loans only to a small 
extent. 
Key words: Default, logit, financial stability 
JEL classification: C25, G33  
1. Introduction 
Credit risk is inherently present in economic activity. This calls for proper risk 
management techniques that identify, assess and mitigate these threats both at micro- and 
macroeconomic level. The stakeholders of credit risk assessment and mitigation 
techniques can be broadly classified in two categories: (i) entities who buy credit risk – 
such as banks, investment companies, hedge funds etc. – and (ii) central 
authorities/governments that have to ensure a smooth functioning of the economy – i.e. 
price stability and financial stability. This paper aims to provide a credit risk assessment 
of the real sector of the Romanian economy – non-financial companies (NFC) - from the 
perspective of a central authority.  
Corporate defaults
1 on bank debt can result in adverse effects on financial stability by 
means of (i) a direct channel – in which defaults on bank loans may trigger contagion in 
the banking system and (ii) an indirect channel – in which defaults on bank loans can 
lead to failure, with systemic implications on the real economy (output loss, 
unemployment). We try to estimate the risks to financial stability
2 via the direct channel 
by taking into consideration the probability of default (both at individual and aggregate 
level) and the exposures on which NFC could potentially default. 
We use firm-level data for all NFC with bank loans between 2003 and 2006, which 
allows us to employ discrete time models in order (i) to analyze the determinants of 
default and (ii) to estimate the probability of default. The fact that we use the whole 
population in our model overcomes some limitations of previous papers that were biased 
towards large firms or small samples and enables us to draw conclusions at economy 
level. The explanatory variables used capture various financial features of NFC such as 
profitability, liquidity, solvency, indebtedness, asset utilization and group specific 
variables. The identified determinants of default with best discriminatory power are: (i) 
trade credits arrears, (ii) receivables cash conversion time and (iii) interest burden. 
                                                 
1 A company is considered to be in default if it has 90 days past due credit obligations. This definition is 
also consistent with Basel II definition of default. 
2 We follow the methodology proposed by Bunn and Redwood (2003)  The probability of default is estimated for two time horizons: (i) short term – 1 year and 
(ii) medium-long term – 3 years. The reason why we have chosen to estimate a three year 
probability of default is related to the timeliness of input data – usually financial 
statements are available with a time lag of six month, thereby reducing the effective 
period of forecast. We investigate the probability of default for all NFC and two 
additional sub-groups: large firms and firms engaged in foreign trade activities. 
The risks to financial stability are assessed through a measure of aggregate debt at risk, 
which is essentially the estimated probability of default for an individual firm times its 
total bank loans, summed across the whole population. At economy level, debt is 
concentrated in above average risk firms but evolutions in the last years indicate an 
improvement in this context. 
We then build stress-testing scenarios to see how resilient the real sector is to interest rate 
shocks. We find that an interest rate shock will have a low impact on financial stability, a 
fact that can be intuitively explained by the reduced share of bank loans in firms 
financing sources. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of literature on default 
models. Section 3 describes the employed methodology and input data. Section 4 presents 
and analyses the results in the context of financial stability. Section 5 constructs stress-
testing scenarios to evaluate the real sector’s resilience to financial shocks. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
This section provides a snapshot of previous research done on bankruptcy modeling.   
Beaver (1966) is considered to be the pioneer of bankruptcy prediction models. He 
performed an univariate discriminant analysis on 30 financial ratios using a dataset of 
158 firms (50:50 ratio of bankrupt to non-bankrupt). He concluded that cash-flows/equity 
and debt/equity generally increased when approaching default.  
Altman (1968) integrated several variables into one model by means of multivariate 
discriminant analysis (MDA). The aim of MDA is to classify observations into two 
groups based on their explanatory variables. The classification is done through a linear 
function, whereby the optimum weights are derived by maximizing the ratio of squared difference between the two groups’ average scores divided by their pooled variance. The 
final scoring function included the following financial ratios: (i) working capital/total 
assets, (ii) retained earnings/total assets, (iii) earnings before interest and taxes/ total 
assets, (iv) market capitalization/debt and (v) sales total assets. The model correctly 
identifies 90% of the cases one year prior to failure. 
Merton (1974) proposes another approach to bankruptcy modeling. He considers the 
equity of the firm as being equivalent with a call option on the firm’s assets with a strike 
equal to the face value of the firm’s debt. Thus, when the firm’s assets decline below its 
debt value, shareholders are more interested in walking away (i.e. liquidating the firm) 
than in reinvesting more funds. The output of the model is a distance to default and a 
probability of default. The main limitation of the model is that it requires market values 
for equity – i.e. the firm must be publicly traded – in order to deduce the parameters of 
the model. Thus, this approach is not applicable for modeling bankruptcy at economy 
level. 
Ohlson (1980) is the first to use the logistic regression for bankruptcy prediction. It is 
similar to MDA in the sense that it comes up with a function of explanatory variables that 
can classify observations into two or more groups. However MDA has some drawbacks 
when compared to LOGIT models: (i) it assumes that the covariance matrices are the 
same for both groups (bankrupt/non-bankrupt), (ii) it requires normally distributed 
variables which militates against the use of dummy independent variables, (iii) it does not 
allow us to perform significance tests on the weights of explanatory variables, which can 
be done using LOGIT/PROBIT models. The use of linear models for bankruptcy 
prediction has two important requirements: the explanatory variables must be linear and 
monotonous relatively to default
3. This explains why some variables that we reasonably 
expect to have an impact on default do not enter significantly or enter with the wrong 
sign in linear models. Ohlson’s major findings can be briefly summarized as follows. A.) 
He identified four basic factors as being statistically significant in affecting the 
probability of failure: (i) the size of the company, (ii) a measure of financial structure, (iii) 
a measure of performance, (iv) a measure of current liquidity. B.) The inclusion in 
                                                 
3 For LOGIT models explanatory variables have to be linear and monotonous relatively to the log odd of 
default – see Section 3 sample of firms which were already bankrupt at the time of estimation indicates that it is 
much easier to “predict” bankruptcy. This was the case of previous research done in this 
area – such as Altman (1968) – the result being an overstatement of the predictive power 
of models developed and tested. Ohlson included in his estimation sample only 
financially sound companies. The result was a larger prediction error-rate
4 in comparison 
to the rate reported in Altman (1968) as well as most other studies which used data drawn 
from periods prior to 1970. 
Bardos (1998) presents the quantitative framework behind the Banque de France credit 
risk model. The scoring model employs the MDA technique, the reasons for these choice 
being: (i) robustness over time, (ii) interpretability, (iii) simple probabilistic utilization, 
(iv) easy maintenance. The principle of MDA consists in finding the optimum frontier 
between failed and non-failed companies, which in this case is a linear function of  some 
preselected financial ratios. The scoring model is complementary to the expert based 
rating system in place at Banque de France. Whereas scores are produced annually, when 
accounting information become available, ratings are updated more frequently – as they 
use other information as well, especially of a qualitative nature. 
Lennox (1999) finds that profitability, leverage and cashflow have important effects on 
the probability of bankruptcy. He uses heteroskedasticity tests in order to determine 
whether there are variables with non-linear effects on the probability of bankruptcy. He 
finds that cashflow and leverage are non-linear relatively to probability of bankruptcy. 
These effects are then incorporated into the model which significantly improves the 
predictive accuracy. By estimating a heteroskedastic probit model, he allows the 
residual’s variance to be a function – he adopts an exponential functional form – of the 
variables which show non-linear effects. The paper also compared probit and logit 
models with discriminant analysis, the former models being superior to the latter. 
Moreover Lennox concludes that the superiority over discriminant analysis was greater 
for well-specified non-linear probit and logit models. 
Bunn and Redwood (2003) find a strong non-linear relationship between profitability 
and probability of bankruptcy, negative profitability being associated with the highest 
marginal effect. They incorporate these effects by splitting the profitability variable into 
                                                 
4 Average of type I and type II errors several intervals and introducing dummy variables. The profitability boundaries are 
selected so as to be wide enough to allow coefficients to be significantly different from 
each other. The probability of bankruptcy are applied to the analysis of the risks to 
financial stability arising from the UK corporate sector by defining a variable called debt 
at risk, which is essentially an expected loss with a loss given default of one. The authors 
then investigate the magnitude and distribution of these risks. They find that debt at risk 
is concentrated among a few firms and that these firms are generally not the firms with 
the highest probability of failure. Furthermore firms with highest probability of default 
tend to be small and therefore hold relatively small amounts of debt. As a possible 
extension to this paper the debt at risk can be used in a contagion model for the banking 
system to see whether banks are able to absorb potential shocks from the real economy.  
Another important element in credit risk modeling is represented by model validation. 
The importance of sound validation mechanisms stems from the fact that low quality 
credit risk models can lead to sub-optimal decisions (e.g.: for credit institutions this could 
mean sub-optimal capital allocation, while for central authorities this could adversely 
reflect on the policy measures because of  poor aggregate risk picture at economy level).  
Ooghe et al (1999) validated eight international failure prediction models
5 on one data set 
of Belgian firms. The models employed either a MDA or LOGIT approach. The 
performance indicators used to compare the models were twofold: (i) type I and type II 
errors based on the original and new cut-off points and (ii) Gini-coefficients which 
enabled to compare the models on a more global way. The authors came up with several 
explanations for the differences in performance across models: (i) nationality of 
estimation sample – models estimated on European companies are better able to 
discriminate between failing and non-failing Belgian firms than models on Anglo-Saxon 
companies – , (ii) age of the model – more recent models show a better performance – , 
(iii) company size – models that were initially estimated on large firms were found to be 
a better prediction power than those designed for both large and small firms, (iv) 
complexity of the model – there is no clear evidence of a strong relationship between 
model performance and complexity of the variables included in the model. 
                                                 
5 Altman (1968), Bilderbeek (1979), Ooghe and Verbaere (1982),  Zavgren (1983), Gloubos and 
Grammaticos (1988) – two versions – , Keasy and McGuiness (1990), Ooghe et al (1991) Engelmann et al (2003) focus on the discriminatory power of credit rating systems. They 
review the widely used – in practice – validation techniques namely the Cumulative 
Accuracy Profile (CAP) and the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC). By 
demonstrating the relationship between Area Under Curve (AUC) below ROC and CAP, 
they show that these summary statistics of ROC and CAP are equivalent. Furthermore, 
they use these result in order to develop confidence intervals for these statistics. An 
important conclusion that can be drawn from this paper is that different rating models can 
be compared/ validated by means of ROC/CAP only on the same data set. The authors 
also show that replacing individual accounting ratios with their likelihood ratios improves 
the discriminatory power of the model. 
Hammerle et al (2003) provides further guidelines on how to use performance measures 
to evaluate credit rating systems. The authors reach three important conclusions: A.) The 
results of the performance measures are dependent on the true probabilities of failure in 
the underlying portfolio. Thus, measures such as ROC/CAP are not able to distinguish 
between properties of the rating system and properties of the rated portfolio. B.) 
Following A.), different rating systems cannot be compared across time and across 
portfolios. As a positive result, it follows that traditional performance measures can be 
used to compare rating systems at the same point in time within one portfolio. C.) The 
highest performance measure is to be assigned to the rating system which assesses all true 
probabilities correctly. 
 
3. Methodology and input data 
3.1. Methodology 
We use in this paper a logit methodology in order to estimate the probability of default of 
NFC, using as explanatory variables firms’ financial characteristics prior to default. Logit 
models assume an unobservable (latent) dependent variable y* which is related to an 
observed categorical variable y – company status, which is either default (y=1) or non-
default (y=0) – through the following relationships: 
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*
i is a vector of predictors for the ith observation, β a 
vector of unknown parameters and ε a logistic distributed
6 error term. For probit models 
the error term is considered to be normal distributed. The main difference between the 
logit and probit distribution is that it accounts better for fat tails. 
The probability that a firm fails (yi=1) can therefore be deduced as: 
(3)  , where F(·) is the 
logistic cumulative density function. 
) ( ) ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 (
* β β ε ε β i i i i i i x F x P x P y P y P i = < − = > + = > = =
The vector β of unknown parameters is estimated by maximizing the logarithm of the 















, where S1 is the set of defaulting firms and 
S2 is the set of non-defaulting firms. Maximizing with respect to β is equivalent to 









The system must be solved numerically by an iterative procedure. At any stage of the 









positive definite, and the iterations will converge to a maximum of the likelihood 
function independently of the initial values of β. 
A useful property of logit (as well as probit) models is that they have variable marginal 
contribution rates, in contrast to classical linear probability models where the marginal 
contribution rates are constant. By taking the first derivative of the probability of 
observing a default we get: 










, where f(·) is the logistic probability density function,   is 
the jth explanatory variable of the ith firm and β
j
i x
j is the correspondent weight/coefficient. 
                                                 
6 
x e




) (  In order to obtain aggregate marginal contribution rates for the whole estimation sample, 
we can evaluate the derivative at the mean values of explanatory variables. 
Equation (6) implies constant marginal substitution rates. This means that the required 
variation of a variable x
j in order to compensate for a change in a variable x
h, so that the 





























Such a property may be somehow unrealistic in practice. Laitinen (2000) comes up with 
the following example to underline the necessity of variable marginal substitution rates: 
he considers first a firm for which both liquidity (cash/total assets) and profitability 
(cash-flow/total assets) stand at the same level (say 5%). He further assumes that the 
level of liquidity is considered more critical in such way that a firm would be considered 
equally risky at level of liquidity of say 3% if profitability doubled to 10%. This implies a 
marginal substitution rate between the two variables of -2/5. Next he considers a firm 
with 5% profitability and 50% liquidity. If the same rate of compensation is maintained, a 
fall in liquidity, to say 48%, would still require a doubling of profitability in order for the 
predicted risk to remain unchanged. Laitinen argues that this is unrealistically as one 
would not be greatly concerned whether liquidity is measured at 50% or 48% and thus 
constant marginal substitution rates appear unreasonable.  
Laitinen proposes
7 to solve this problem by introducing cross products and squares of 
variables in the logit model. However by introducing higher order terms in the model the 
economic intuition behind the explanatory variables may be lost and the model may 
suffer from data mining bias. Thus, for the purpose of this paper – to find determinants of 
default and to quantify risks to financial stability – we have chosen to use only 
economically meaningful variables in order to model default at the cost of having 
constant substitution rates. 
                                                 
7 He uses a Taylor expansion of the underlying functional relationship at the mean values of the variables in 
order to justify the inclusion of higher order terms in the model We will now focus on the steps that we follow in order to derive a model of default. First 
of all, we employ several filters on candidate explanatory variables in order to select only 
the relevant variables.  
In a first step we use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test in order to identify and exclude 
problematic ratios that do not relate to default as expected based on theoretical reasons. 
We perform a one tail hypothesis test to compare the distribution of values of defaulters 
and non-defaulters for each candidate variable. The null hypothesis for this test is that the 
two groups are drawn from the same continuous distribution. The alternative hypothesis 
is that the distribution of the variable for defaulters is smaller/larger than the distribution 
of the variable for non-defaulters. For each potential value x of the candidate variable, the 
KS test compares the proportion of x1 of values – from the first group – less than x with 
proportion x2 of values – from the second group – less than x. The test statistic
8 is the 
maximum difference over all x values: 
(8) , where F1(x) is the proportion x1 of values less than x and 
F2(x) is the proportion x2 of values less than x.  
)] ( 2 ) ( 1 max[ x F x F KS − =
In a second filter we check whether the underlying assumptions of the LOGIT model 
apply to the explanatory which passed the first filter. Equation (3) implies a linear, 

















1 0  
To test for this assumption we divide the sample in several subsamples that contain all 
the same number of observation and within each group a historical default rate (the 
empirical logarithm of the odds of default) is computed. Finally we run a linear 
regression of the historical default rate on the mean values of the variable. Then we 
exclude the variables for which the assumptions of the linear regression do not hold. 
                                                 
8 The p-value of the test statistic is computed as  , where 
2 2λ − = e p















= λ , with n1 being the size of the first group and n2 
the size of the second group. In the next step we run univariate logit models with the remaining candidate ratios to find 
the most powerful variables. We check the discriminatory power both in the sample and 
out of the sample for each variable. The univariate discriminatory power is based on 
accuracy ratios (CAP/ROC) – for a detailed discussion on discriminatory power measures 
see below. Variables with a univariate ROC of less than 53% are dropped. It is worth 
mentioning that variables with high discriminatory power are not necessary significant 
when introduced in a multivariate model. 
The last step of candidate variables selection consists of multicolinearity tests. We 
compute the correlation matrix for all selected variables and we choose only those ratios 
with the highest accuracy ratio for each correlation subgroup. Ratios are sorted in the 
correlation matrix by their accuracy ratio and they are dropped if the correlation 
coefficient is higher than 0.7
9. 
Having filtered the candidate variables we proceed to derive a multivariate model of 
default. We employ a backward selection method where we initially estimate the full 
model – including all the variables which passed the selection filters – and then 
eliminating the worst covariates based on their significance (calculated with likelihood 
ratio test). For the significance test we use the G-test which compares the model with the 









− − = , where l(M-1) is the likelihood of the model without the variable 
and l(M) is the likelihood of the model with all the variables. G follows a Chi-squared 
distribution with two degrees of freedom. If the result of (10) gives a result inferior to 
some predefined confidence level (99% in this case), we can reasonably suppose that the 
tested variable does not add performance to the model. The variable should then be 
excluded. 
The process of estimation of the multivariate model of default is split in two steps. First, 
we apply a bootstrapping methodology and conduct 100 simulations. In each simulation 
we derive a multivariate model using the backward selection method and a proportion of 
50:50 of defaulted to non-defaulted companies. For this purpose we use all the defaulted 
                                                 
9 The idea is to set the threshold high enough in order not to loose variables. The threshold of 0.7 is also 
used by Central Bank of Austria in their credit risk model. firms and draw a random sample out of the non-defaulted firms of same size as the 
defaulted ones. In this way we ensure that the model is able to capture better the 
characteristics of defaulting entities. Finally we count how often a certain model 
specification is obtained as well as how often each explanatory variable is observed 
during the simulations. We then choose the model with the highest economic 
performance (ROC/CAP) and/or statistical performance. In the second step, in order to 
derive the final model we have to adjust the estimated logarithm of the odds of default 
with the difference between the historical observed default rate of the underlying 



















β α , where PD is the estimated probability of 
default, πd is the observed default rate in the real portfolio and p is the proportion of 
defaulted firms used during bootstrapping. 
In the final stage we run two types of validation techniques on our final model: (i) 
economic performance measures and (ii) statistical performance measures. 
The cost function is the first economic performance measure used. The derived model  
classifies firms from the riskiest (highest probability of default) to the safest (lowest 
probability of default). We aim to find a probability threshold in order to isolate good 
firms from bad ones. By doing this we are faced with two types of errors (Table 1). Type 
I error consists of classifying a firm as being non-defaulting and the firm subsequently 
defaults. Type II error is made when a non-defaulting firm is classified as being in default. 
Table 1: Cost function errors 
Signal\Effective Y=1  Y=0 
Y=1  Correctly classified  Type II error 
Y=0  Type I error  Correctly classified 
For each possible threshold we compute type I (t1) and type II (t2) errors. The associated 
cost function can then be defined if we additionally consider the importance (weights) 
associated with each type of error – respectively w1 and w2: 
(12)    2 2 1 1 w t w t C ⋅ + ⋅ =
The choice of the weights is dependent on the objective of the decision maker. For 
example if a central bank uses credit risk models for monetary policy purposes, in order 
to determine eligible collateral for its refinancing operations, then they would be most concerned with a Type I error. Thus the central bank will set w1 equal to 1. For the 
purpose of this paper, we are equally concerned with making a type I or type II error. 
Therefore we will use a w1 of 50% and w2 of 50%. After choosing the weights the cost 
function has to be minimized relatively to the threshold. 
The second performance measure used during model validation is the receiver operator 
characteristic (ROC). ROC is an older test, used originally in psychology and medicine. 
The principle behind it is as follows: any model value output – in our case the probability 
of default – can be considered as a cutoff point between good and bad debtors. We can 






) ( =  , where HR(C) is the hit rate
10 for cutoff C
11, H(C) is the number of 
defaulters correctly predicted for the cutoff value C and ND is the total number of 
defaulters in the portfolio.  The second measure needed to obtain the ROC measure is the 






) ( = , where F(C) is the type II error for cutoff C and NND is the total 
number of non-defaulters in the portfolio. With this two measures computed, we can 
proceed to construct a ROC curve and to calculate the ROC measure. The ROC curve is 
constructed by plotting the HR(C) versus FAR(C) for all possible values of C (Figure 1). 
The default model’s performance is better the steeper the ROC curve is at the left end and 
the closer the ROC curve’s position is to the point (0,1). This is similar to having a larger 
area under the ROC curve, which can be computed as: 
(14)   ∫ =
1
0
) ( ) ( FAR d FAR HR A
A naïve model (with no discriminatory power) will always have equivalent values of HR 
and FAR (Figure 1) thus resulting in a area under the ROC curve (AUROC) of 0.5. At the 
other end lies the perfect model which will never classify a defaulted counterparty in the 
non-defaulted group, thus yielding an AUROC of 1. In practice AUROC for default 
models ranges between 0.5 and 1. 
                                                 
10 Actually this is 1-Type I error 
11 C is a probability of default ranging between 0 and 1 An equivalent performance measure for ROC is the cumulative accuracy profile (CAP). 
To obtain a CAP curve (Figure 2), all debtors are first ordered by their probability of 
default in decreasing order – or alternatively by the model output values – from the 
riskiest to the safest. For each quantile of the probability of default distribution, the CAP 
curve is constructed by calculating the percentage of defaulters out of the total number of 
defaulters which have a probability of default lower than the considered quantile. A 
perfect model will assign the highest probability of default to the defaulters. Thus, in this 
case, the CAP is increasing linearly and then staying at one (Figure 2 green line). For a 
naïve model the fraction x  of all debtors with the highest probability of default will 
contain only x% of all defaulters. 
Figure 1: Receiver operator characteristic curves  Figure 2: Cumulative accuracy profile 
 
Note: Figures were constructed using random data 
aP 
aR 
The quality of a default model as measured by CAP is the accuracy ratio. It is defined as 
the ratio of the area aR between the CAP of the model being validated and the CAP of the 







AR =  
It can be shown
12 that the CAP measure – AR – is equivalent to the ROC measure – A – , 
satisfying the following relationship: 
(16) 1 2 − ⋅ = A AR  
                                                 
12 Engelmann et al (2003) As a consequence of (16) we will use throughout the model results section only the ROC 
measure in order to be consistent. 
ROC/CAP measures can be used to validate and compare different models on the same 
portfolios only. This is because AUROC and AR depend on the true underlying 
probability of default of the borrowers in the portfolio under consideration. 
Although there are no absolute values for ROC/CAP measures that enable us to label a 
model as good or bad, we can find the following reference values in the literature
13 
(Table 2): 
Table 2: Indicative values for ROC and CAP measures 
AR(%) A(%)  Description 
0 50  Naïve  model 
40-60 70-80 Acceptable  discriminatory power 
60-80 80-90 Excellent  discriminatory  power 
+80 +90 Exceptional  discriminatory  power 
The second type of validation techniques that we employ are the statistical tests. We aim 
to verify with these tests whether the probabilities of default predicted by the model are 
consistent with the real observed values. 
The test that is most frequently used when explanatory variables are continuous is the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test. It consists of dividing the predicted probabilities 
of default in deciles and to compare the number of effective  defaults (y=1) in each 
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j recording the status of the company – 
i.e. default/non-default –, nk is the number of observation in group k and  k π& & &  is  the 
average probability of default in group k as predicted by the model. Hosmer and 
Lemeshow have showed that under the conditions of correct model specifications, 
follows a Chi-square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom.  C ˆ
A second test which checks the calibration quality of the model is the Spiegelhalter test. 
It consists of computing the mean square error of predicted probabilities of default in a 
first step, as: 
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1
, where is the predicted probability of default for the ith 
obligor and N is the total number of firms. Using (18), a hypothesis test is conducted with 
the null that all predicted probabilities of default match exactly the true, but unknown, 
probability of default. Under the assumptions of independence of default events, MSE 
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After constructing and validating the default model we use the predicted probabilities of 
default in order to assess risks to financial stability arising from the real sector. Our 
approach is similar to Bunn and Redwood (2003).  To assess risks to financial stability 
we analyze debt at risk (DAR), which is a rough measure of the expected loss on bank 
loans for each firm, reflecting both the probability of default and the bank exposure – it is 
assumed that the loss given default is 100%. DAR constitutes an upper bound for 
expected loss, because in practice banks recover a proportion of the defaulted loans. DAR 
is defined as the predicted probability of default of a firm multiplied with its total bank 
loans: 
(22) , where D i i i D y DAR ⋅ = ˆ i  is the total amount of bank loans for firm i. 
Using the DAR for each firm, we aggregate in order to obtain a micro-based measure of 
risk to financial stability: 
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1
We also use a macro based measure of risk to financial stability, which involves 
multiplying the bank debt of each firm with the mean predicted probability of default at 
economy level: 
(24) , where y ~   represents the unweighted mean of all firm-level 
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~same for all firms in the micro-based measure. By comparing DARMICRO with DARMACRO 
we can analyze the concentration of debt – i.e. whether it is concentrated among riskier or 







I = , if the index is above 1 it means that debt is concentrated into above 
average risk firms whereas values below one indicate the opposite.  
3.2. Input data 
The data used for building the explanatory variables (Annex 1) is taken from the financial 
statements reported to the Ministry of Public Finance (MFP) by the NFC
14 with bank 
loans. In order to identify companies with bank loans we mapped the database from MFP 
with the database from the credit register. The dataset is biased towards the 
manufacturing industry and retail/wholesale trade (Annex 2), as these two sectors have 
the largest share of total private credit. 
 By using financial ratios to model default we are making an implicit assumption that 
accounting data provide an accurate picture of the financial position of each firm. This is 
a limitation of models which use financial ratios derived from accounting data as 
explanatory variables. Measuring financial ratios is not equivalent to observing the real 
characteristics, but rather proxy measures for the relevant aspects. As Morris (1989) 
pointed out, a unique economic event can results in a variety of ratio patterns, and a 
single pattern of ratios can be the result of a variety of underlying economic conditions. 
Figure 3 gives an example of the 
ambiguities that a financial ratio can bring 
about. For example, depending on the cost 
flow method used for inventories, in an 
inflationary environment a firm can have a 
lower profitability when using LIFO 
method  versus a higher profitability when 
using the FIFO method. Another distortion 





                                                 
14 In order to select the NFC from the MFP database we excluded the financial companies – NACE code: 





FIFO inventories in the financial ratios can be produced by capitalizing versus expensing specific costs 
decisions. 
Most of the Romanian NFC report under the Romanian Accounting Standard (RAS) 
which implies only a simplified version of the balance-sheet, income statement and some 
additional qualitative information. This is why we could not take account of any potential 
distortions which could be present in the data as a result of different cost flow 
assumptions, other earnings management strategies or off balance sheet financing 
methods. 
For the default information – i.e. a firm has 90 days or more past due payments on bank 
loans – there were two main sources available. Firms report their arrears in their financial 
statements, including the bank loans arrears. The second source is the credit register. By 
comparing the default information from the two sources we found data from the credit 
register to be more reliable. By using default information from the credit register we are 
constrained
15 to the timeframe between 2003 and 2006. We consider a firm to be in 
default if it defaults in any month of the chosen time horizon (1 year or 3 years). We 
define a year as a financial/calendar year extending from 1 January to 31 December. 
Table 3: Data structure – number of observations and default rates 




1 year default rate 
(%) 
2 years default rate 
(%) 
3 years default rate 
(%) 
2003 30,082  3.34  5.84  7.35 
2004 32,977  2.78  4.73  … 
2005 42,369  2.28  …  … 
Source: MFP, Credit register, own calculations 
Table 3 summarizes the data structure obtained, after mapping the MFP with the credit 
register database and excluding firms with anomalies
16 in their financial statements (see 
Annex 2 for a detailed data structure). As a general remark, from Table 3 we can see that 
the decrease in the observed default rate can be largely attributed to the financial 
deepening process that our economy has undergone in the last years (i.e. the increase in 
the number of firms with bank loans). Large firms and firms with foreign trade activities 
present the same pattern for the observed default rates, with some particularities: (i) 
default rates for large companies were at the beginning of the observation period (2003, 
2004) higher than those observed at economy level and more volatile (Annex 2) and (ii) 
                                                 
15 90 days or more past due payments are recorded in the credit register starting from 2004 
16 Firms were excluded if any of the following conditions were fulfilled: (i) Turnover<=0, (ii) Total 
assets<=0, (iii) Common equity<=0, (iv)Total debt<0 firms engaged in foreign trade activities recorded less defaults than the economy (NFC). 
A possible explanation for the high default rate in the corporate sector (large firms) could 
be the fact that many of the large firms were state owned, which could have enabled them 
to default on their debt service without any consequences. 
All explanatory variables are computed at the beginning of the observation period
17 of the 
status of a firm. The tested explanatory variables capture various financial features of a 
firm’s activity: (i) expense structure, (ii) profitability, (iii) leverage/ balance sheet 
structure, (iv) liquidity, (v) investment analysis, (vi) coverage ratios, (vii) growth rates 
and (viii) cash-flow analysis. We built and tested 42 financial ratios, some of which were 
previously used in the literature of default models other variables being new. Explanatory 
variables were cutoff at a threshold of 1% in order to exclude extreme values
18. 
The descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables used in modeling default are 
broadly in line with economic intuition (Annex 3). Thus ex-ante profitability for firms 
who default is significantly lower and more volatile
19 than for non-defaulting firms. 
Firms with a higher ratio of trade arrears to total debt are more prone to default. Higher 
interest burden ratios are associated with higher default ratios. Cash conversion days of 
account receivables is another important determinant of default. Firms which convert 
more slowly receivables in cash are more likely to default on their debt service. The 
ability of a firm to generate positive cash-flows is also closely linked to the default event, 
higher cash-flows ratios being associated with lower default rates. Defaulting firms are 
ex-ante less liquid than non-defaulting firms – which may be a result of poor 
management, adverse economic conditions etc. Traditional leverage ratios – such as debt 
to equity – seem not to be able to discriminate between defaulting and non-defaulting 
firms. A potential explanation could be that shareholders – of small firms - usually 
choose to finance their business by crediting their own firm and not by increasing the 
equity – this is because debt is senior to equity in case of default. As the business expands, 
                                                 
17 For example if we estimate a one year probability of default for year 2005 we will use financial ratios as 
of end of year 2004 
18 There are two ways to deal with extreme values: (i) either to exclude observations above a certain 
threshold, (ii) either to bring all observations at a specific threshold. The second approach has the 
disadvantage that it modifies characteristics of firms. Thus at the cost of loosing default observations we 
chose the first approach. 
19 Net profit margin and operating profit margin are more volatile for default firms than for non-defaulting 
firms the total debt of the firm increases – both from external creditors and from shareholders 
who lend to their own firm – while equity remains relatively constant – increases only by 




Our first default model estimates the one year default probability for all NFC. We 
develop – using the procedures described in section 3.1 – three default models using 
cross-sectional data for years 2003-2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006
21. After validating 
each model, both in-sample, out of sample and out-of time, the best model was the one 
built on 2004-2005 data. Thus, in presenting the results for the one year default model we 
will refer only to the 2004-2005 model.  
In the variable selection process we used the selection filters described earlier. The 
linearity and monotony filter was the most subjective filter in deciding whether or not to 
include a variable in the final model. Annex 4 presents the results of this filter for all 
variables which passed the KS test (Annex 3). Clearly the results of this filter are 
sensitive to the choice of the number of groups
22 used when regressing the variables 
against the logarithm of the odds of default. After investigating all the assumptions of the 
regression, we select variables with an R-square greater than 50%
23. In the last two steps 
we check the accuracy ratio of variables (Annex 5) and if they are correlated. Finally we 
run the bootstrapping exercise to derive an intermediate default model which is then 
adjusted to account for the real default rate of the portfolio. 
The determinants of default, as resulting from the default model, are (Table 4): (i) trade 
arrears to total debt, (ii) receivables cash conversion days, (iii)  short term debt turnover, 
(iv) interest burden and (v) return on assets. If a firm finances its activity via trade 
arrears it risks that at some point the suppliers will stop providing them with the 
necessary working capital, thus being unable to honor its contracts with the clients and 
                                                 
20 Annex 6 contains additional information relevant to model results 
21 The first year relates to the financial information, while the second one relates to the default information 
22 By choosing a relatively small number of groups – 50 – we ensure that we exclude only those variables 
with no ‘clear’ linear and monotonous relationship to the default event. 
23 Although the variables which contain trade arrears do not satisfy this condition we let them pass further. 
There are many firms which have no trade arrears but default on their debt – for these firms the trade 
arrears variable has no discriminatory power. However if we look only at firms with non zero trade arrears 
(Annex 4), default is clearly increasing in this variable. finally defaulting on their debt service. The time period of conversion of account 
receivables into cash has a direct implication on default: a delay of cash-inflows from 
customers will be ultimately transmitted into a delay of debt service payment, which may 
cause a firm to default. Short term debt turnover measures the ability of the firm to 
efficiently use its short term debt resources to generate income: higher values for this 
variable are associated with more comfortable positions as regards default (i.e. lower 
probabilities of default). Interest burden is a measure of the cost of indebtedness 
relatively to the volume of activity: thus as the variable goes up we will have 
progressively higher probabilities of default. The return on assets measures the ability of 
a firm to efficiently employ its assets to generate profit: as the profitability goes down the 
probability of debt service default is increasing. 
Table 4: Model 1 – Logit model for 1 year default horizon using 2004-2005 data 
-Number of observations in the dataset used for building the model: 17,727 out of which 456 defaults 
     -Number of observations in the bootstrapping exercise: 912 out of which 456 defaults 
-Number of observations in the dataset used for testing the model: 8,863 out of which 224 defaults 
-In sample ROC: 74.2% 
-Out of sample ROC: 75% 
-Out of time ROC (2005-2006): 75% 
-Neutral cost policy function: 
     - Optimal cutoff: 2.3%, Hit rate: 71.7%, False alarm rate: 32.7% 
Variables Occurrences*  Coefficient  Standard error  tstat  Marginal  effect 
(%)** 
Intercept – from 
bootstrapping 
exercise   n.a. -0.44 
0.18 -2.4   
Adjustment 
coefficient  n.a. -3.63 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Trade arrears to 




Short term debt 









Interest burden  100 14.36  2.58  5.56  26.3 
Return on assets  94 -2.56 0.70  -3.67  -4.7 
n.a. – not applicable 
* indicates how many times a variable appeared in a final model out of 100 bootstrapping iterations. This 
model specification appeared in 23 iterations. 
** evaluated at mean values of explanatory variables 
The model presented in Table 4 produces acceptable discriminatory power both in and 
out of the sample used for estimation, as well as out of time. The optimal cut-off point 
that is can be used to make binary predictions is 2.3% for this model which implies a 
71.7% hit rate and a false alarm rate of 32.7%. The adjustment made to the intercept has an important implication when using the model for forecasting purposes: we assume that 
the a posteriori observed default rate of the portfolio is the same with the default rate of 
the portfolio used in building the model. 
The predicted one year probability of default at economy level recorded mixed evolutions 
(Figure 4). It decreased slightly in 2005 compared to 2004 and increased over the levels 
recorded in 2004 for the year 2006. These dynamics can be explained by the evolutions 
of the determinants of default: (i) trade arrears as a percentage of total debt decreased, 
reflecting an improved payment discipline, (ii) profitability decreased slightly, (iii) 
interest burden increased, mainly due to the financial deepening process, (iv) receivables 
cash conversion cycle deteriorated slightly and (v) short term debt turnover slowed down 
(Table 5). 
Figure 4: One year probability of default evolution at economy level 
 
Table 5: Determinants of default dynamics – evaluated at mean level 
Variables  2003 2004 2005 
Trade arrears to total 
debt  7.8% 6.5% 5.8% 
Return on assets  9.7%  9.8%  8.7% 
Short term debt turnover  4.14  4.16  3.96 
Interest  burden  2.17% 2.38% 2.40% 
Receivables cash 
conversion cycle  61.9 58.0 63.5 
 Debt at risk at firm level – computed as a percentage of total bank loans – increased 
slightly in the timeframe 2004-2006 (Table 6). Bank loans are concentrated into above 
average risk firms, as indicated by the concentration index. In 2006 the situation 
improved, bank loans being concentrated into less risky firms compared to year 2005. 
Effective defaulted debt is consistent with the evolution of the concentration index: it has 
increased in 2005 and it has recorded a sharp decrease in 2006. When compared to debt 
at risk, effective default rate is smaller and more volatile. The reason is that effective 
default rate is also influenced by the loss given default and the exposure at risk
24. Thus 
debt at risk can be viewed as a more conservative risk measure of financial stability via 
the direct channel. 
Table 6: Risks to financial stability via the direct channel 
 2004  2005  2006 
DAR_micro (% of total 
bank loans) 
3.73 3.82  3.94 
DAR_macro (% of total 
bank loans) 
2.98 2.80  3.1 
Concentration index  1.25  1.36  1.27 
Effective defaulted debt (% 
of total debt)* 
1.18 2.89  0.52 
*Effective defaulted was computed by dividing the defaulted bank loans amounts to the total outstanding 
bank loans amounts at the beginning of the year 
At sector level
25, retail and wholesale firms as well as manufacturing firms have the 
lowest probability of default and the lowest debt at risk (Figure 5 and Annex 5). This is 
benefic to financial stability as these two sectors absorb more than 70% of total bank 
resources that are channeled to the real sector. Agriculture, extractive industry and 
utilities have a more precarious profile regarding credit risk, but they do not hold 
significant bank resources in order to threaten financial stability. 
The differences across sectors regarding credit risk can be explained by analyzing the 
determinants of default: (i) trade and services sectors have the highest payment discipline, 
while extractive industry and utilities sector record the lowest payment discipline – as 
indicated by trade arrears and receivables cash conversion cycle, (ii) interest burden is 
more prominent in the services sector and extractive industry, while posing less problems 
                                                 
24 Debt at risk can be considered an expected loss with 100% loss given default and an exposure at risk 
equal to the whole amount of bank loans outstanding at the end of the year previous to the default horizon. 
25 The results we infer at sector level should be treated with care as they are produced from a global model 
– i.e. we estimated the model using all sectors. To obtain a more accurate picture of risks at sector level, 
specific models for each sector should be developed. The main constraint here is the limited number of 
defaults for some sectors.  to manufacturing and trade sectors, (iii) constructions and services sector are the most 
profitable economic sectors, while extractive industry is the less efficient in resource 
utilization, (iv) trade and services have the highest ability to leverage on short term debt 
to generate turnover. 
Figure 5: Probability of default for the main economic sectors (2006) 
 
The second model estimates the probability of default for a three year time horizon, using 
financial information from year 2003 and default information from years 2004-2006 
Table 7). Compared to the one year default model, the three year probability of default 
has 4 specific determinants (apart from those that appear also in the one year model): (i) 
asset turnover, (ii) cash ratio, (iii) debt to total assets and (iv) operating expenses 
efficiency.  
The model yields acceptable discriminatory power both in sample and out of the sample, 
but it could not be tested out of time due to limited data availability (Table 7). The 
optimal cutoff stands higher at 5.5% compared to 2.3% in the one year model, reflecting 
higher probabilities of default. Figure 6 compares the one year with the three year 
probability of default, the results being in line with economic theory, namely that default 
probability is increasing with the time horizon. Using financial information from 2005, 
mean one year probability of default stands at 3.1% versus 8% at a three year horizon. 
 Table 7: Model 2 – Logit model for 3 year default horizon using 2003-2006 data 
-Number of observations in the dataset used for building the model: 16267 out of which 1080 defaults 
     -Number of observations in the bootstrapping exercise: 2160 out of which 1080 defaults 
-Number of observations in the dataset used for testing the model: 8,133 out of which 550 defaults 
-In sample ROC: 74.1% 
-Out of sample ROC: 73.12% 
-Neutral cost policy function: 
     - Optimal cutoff: 5.5%, Hit rate: 26.2%, False alarm rate: 37.62% 
Variables Occurrences*  Coefficient  Standard error  tstat  Marginal  effect 
(%)** 
Intercept – from 
bootstrapping 
exercise   n.a. -2.20 0.40
-5.48  
Adjustment 
coefficient  n.a. -2.64 n.a.
n.a. n.a. 
Trade arrears to 
total debt  73 1.17 0.30 3.89  5.71
Interest burden  100 19.25 2.17 8.85  93.81
Asset turnover  87 -0.19 0.04 -4.41  -0.93
Receivables cash 
conversion days  100 0.0037 0.00 5.26  0.02
Cash ratio  48 -1.09 0.35 -3.15  -5.32
Debt to total 
assets 
41 
 0.71 0.22 3.18  3.46
Operating 
expenses 
efficiency  10 1.24 0.38 3.24  6.03
n.a. – not applicable 
* indicates how many times a variable appeared in a final model out of 100 bootstrapping iterations.  
** evaluated at mean values of explanatory variables 
The dynamics of the three years probability of default is similar to that of the one year: it 
increased from a mean level of 7.5% in 2003 to 8% at the end of 2005 (see Annex 6). The 
distribution of probabilities of default by economic sectors is consistent with the results 
obtained in the first model: the less riskiest economic sectors over a three years horizon 
are the manufacturing and the retail and wholesale trade sectors, while agriculture, 
extractive industry and utilities have a higher credit risk. 
The estimated debt at risk for the three years horizon overestimates the true debt at risk 
for this time horizon. This is because we multiplied the estimated three years probability 
of default with the total
26 amount of outstanding bank loans for a firm, in computing debt 
at risk. Thus we assume that bank loans have an average maturity of 3 years, which is not 
consistent with reality (most bank loans are granted on a short term). Furthermore banks 
usually grant medium-long term loans only to financially sound companies (i.e. low long 
term probability of default), which pledges again for a lower true debt at risk than the one 
                                                 
26 We did not have the distribution of bank loans by maturities at firm level we have estimated. Nevertheless we can consider the estimated debt at risk as a worst 
case scenario measure of risk to financial stability. Even in this case risk to financial 
stability is at a moderate level: retail and wholesale trade sector and manufacturing 
industry, which absorb together most of the bank loans, generate a debt at risk over a 
three years horizon (2006-2008) of 6.3% and 9.2% (Annex 6). 
Figure 6: One year versus three year probability of default for all NFC 
(2005-2006, 2005-2008) 
The third model estimates probability of default for large companies
27 on a one year time 
horizon, using a pooled dataset for large firms between 2003 and 2005
28. By analyzing 
the empirical default data of large firms (Annex 2), it appears that they have a higher 
default rate when compared to all NFC (2004 and 2005 only). A possible explanation 
could be the fact that large firms usually have a higher negotiation power
29 in their 
relationship with credit institutions, which could enable them to have 90 days past due 
bank loans payments without any consequences. For the year 2006 the empirical default 
rate stands below that of the real sector, reflecting an improved payment discipline. 
                                                 
27 Net sales in excess of EUR 50 million OR more than 250 average number of employees during a year 
28 We use this approach because of the limited number of defaults of large firms in each year (see Annex 2). 
29 Moreover some defaults come from large state owned companies with poor corporate governance 
policies. The estimated model
30 identified five determinants of default for large firms: (i) 
productivity, (ii) interest burden, (iii) debt to total assets, (iv) asset turnover and (v) cash 
balance. The dynamics of explanatory variables indicate a decrease of liquidity coupled 
with an increase in productivity of large firms in the time period 2003-2005 (Table 9). 
Part of these dynamics could be attributed to the way we defined large firms: as the 
EURRON exchange rate fluctuated, the threshold for large firms changed, pushing firms 
in and out of the estimation sample. 
The model produces excellent discriminatory power (in sample) with a ROC of 80.6%. 
The HL test indicates that the estimated probabilities of default are well calibrated to the 
true default probabilities. The optimal cutoff for a neutral cost policy function is 2.3% 
with a hit rate of 89.5% and a false alarm rate of 42% (Table 8). 
Table 8: Model 3 – Logit model for 1 year default horizon for large firms using a pooled dataset between 
2003 and 2005 
-Number of observations in the dataset used for building the model: 3199 out of which 105 defaults 
     -Number of observations in the bootstrapping exercise: 210 out of which 105 defaults 
-In sample ROC: 80.57% 
-Calibration quality: HL-test=15.88 (Critical value at 99% confidence=21) 
-Neutral cost policy function: 
     - Optimal cutoff: 2.3%, Hit rate: 89.5%, False alarm rate: 42% 
Variables Occurrences*  Coefficient  Standard error  tstat  Marginal  effect 
(%)** 
Intercept – from 
bootstrapping 
exercise   n.a. 0.44 0.61 0.71 
 
Adjustment 
coefficient  n.a. -3.83 n.a. n.a. 
n.a. 
Cash ratio  187 -4.15 1.75 -2.36  -3.5
Interest burden  565 34.60 11.05 3.13  29.3
Asset turnover  192 -0.78 0.31 -2.49  -0.7
Debt to total 
assets  5 1.59 0.66 2.40  1.3
Productivity  366 -0.25 0.075 -3.34  -0.2
n.a. – not applicable 
* indicates how many times a variable appeared in a final model out of 1000 bootstrapping iterations 
** evaluated at mean values of explanatory variables 
Estimated probability of default for large firms increased in 2005 relative to 2004, mainly 
due to the drop in liquidity, while ameliorating in 2006 on the basis of productivity gains. 
(Figure 7). Debt at risk as a percentage of total bank loans (for large firms) decreased in 
2006 at 4.74% after peaking in 2005 at 5.09%. Concentration index indicates that bank 
loans to large firms are absorbed by above average risk firms. Despite the relative high 
                                                 
30 For this model we removed outliers above 99.5% (two tail) for each explanatory variable level of debt at risk of large firms when compared to debt at risk of all NFC, large firms’ 
effective defaulted debt stands much lower when compared to the effective defaulted debt 
at economy level. 
Figure 7: One year probability of default for large firms 
 
Table 9: Determinants of default dynamics for large firms – evaluated at mean level 
Variables  2003 2004 2005 
Cash ratio  24% 15% 16%
Interest burden  1.7% 1.9% 1.7%
Asset turnover  1.51 1.52 1.53
Debt to total assets  0.59 0.58 0.58
Productivity  4.1 4.4 4.8
The last model we developed estimates the probability of default of firms engaged in 
foreign trade activities
31. Apart from the determinants of default identified in the model 
for the whole economy, a specific determinant of default for foreign trade firms is the 
share of labor costs to total operating costs (Table 10). Usually this ratio is higher for 
firms involved in active processing business, as their competitive advantage lies in the 
relatively cheap labor force they can employ. Wage growth and domestic currency 
appreciation in the last years eroded this advantage, thereby deteriorating the financial 
                                                 
31 A firm was considered to do foreign trade business if it either had exported or imported goods or services 
in a given year position of firms involved in this type of business. Thus higher values for labor costs to 
total operating costs are associated with higher probabilities of default. 
Table 10: Model 4 – Logit model for 1 year default horizon for firms engaged in foreign trade activities 
using a pooled dataset between 2003 and 2005 
-Number of observations in the dataset used for building the model: 22500 out of which 488 defaults 
     -Number of observations in the bootstrapping exercise: 976 out of which 488 defaults 
-In sample ROC: 78.8% 
-Out of sample ROC: 79.13% 
-Neutral cost policy function: 
     - Optimal cutoff: 2.3%, Hit rate: 68.2%, False alarm rate: 76.6% 
Variables Occurrences*  Coefficient  Standard error  tstat  Marginal  effect 
(%)** 
Intercept – from 
bootstrapping 





coefficient  n.a. -3.8 n.a. n.a. 
n.a. 
90 days past due 
trade arrears to 
total debt  42 2.33 0.78 2.97  2.9
Short term debt 
turnover  99 -0.21 0.047 -4.52  -0.26
Interest burden  100 21.45 3.29 6.52  27
Net profit margin  38 -4.82 0.93 -5.21  -6.08
Receivables cash 
conversion cycle  37 0.0032 0.0011 2.99  0.004
Personnel costs 
to total operating 
costs  41 2.37 0.78 3.03  3
n.a. – not applicable 
* indicates how many times a variable appeared in a final model out of 100 bootstrapping iterations 
** evaluated at mean values of explanatory variables 
When compared to all NFC, foreign trade firms have a more sound financial position, 
which translates into lower probabilities of default (Figure 8). Firms with importing 
activities only, have the lowest probability of default, while firms doing only export 
business have the highest risk of default. This situation is benefic to financial stability as 
foreign trade firms absorb 73% of total bank loans while export only firms have 1.2% of 
total private credit.  
The probability of default dynamics of foreign trade firms have slightly increased at the 
analyzed time horizon, mainly due to a slowdown in short term debt turnover and an 




Figure 8: One year probability of default of foreign trade firms (2006) 
 
5. Stress-testing 
Using the default models developed in section 4 we can build different scenarios for 
various macroeconomic variables and investigate their effects on the probabilities of 
default via the explanatory variables. There are several aspects that have to be considered 
when building the scenarios: (i) consistency – we have to take into consideration all the 
implications on the financial statements of a change in a macroeconomic variable, (ii) 
methods of incorporating changes in macroeconomic variables into explanatory variables 
– whether we have an identity or we have to estimate a relationship between input and 
output values of the stress-testing scenarios, (iii) assumptions made – for the situations 
when some information is not available. It is also necessary to mention that we run the 
scenarios on historical data, because usually annual financial statement information 
appears with a lag of at least 6 month. Nevertheless the stress-testing exercise remains 
useful, as it indicates the resilience (even though historical) of the real sector to potential 
changes in macroeconomic variables. We will run scenarios in order to measure the impact of an interest rate hike on the 
probabilities of default. We make the assumption that all bank loans to NFC are granted 
at variable rate and that yield curve shifts in a parallel manner. An upward interest rate 
adjustment will have the following effects on explanatory variables used in the global 
models for default (for 1 and 3 years) (based on identity relationships): 
A. Interest burden will increase. Here we assume that interest costs are exclusively due 
to bank loans. 
B. Caeteris paribus, trade arrears to total debt will not be affected directly – if interest 
costs are too burdensome a firm could service its bank loans at the cost of stopping 
payments to its suppliers, thereby increasing its trade arrears. As we consider only first 
round effects in our scenarios, this variable will remain unchanged. 
C. Receivables cash conversion cycle is not affected by the interest rate hikes directly, 
as this variable measures the ability of the firm to cash in its sales. 
D. Debt to total assets will increase, as the denominator will decrease due to lower 
retained earnings, which are the result of higher interest costs. 
E. Short term debt turnover remains unchanged, as net sales and short term debt are not 
directly affected by the interest rate changes. 
F. Asset turnover will be adjusted upward for the same reason as debt to total assets; we 
have lower assets due to lower retained earnings. 
G. Return on assets will increase if firms are profitable (net profit>0), because of the 
reduction in total assets due to lower retained earnings (in the denominator) and lower 
taxes due to the tax deductible character of interest costs. Similarly, if net income is 
negative return on assets will decrease. 
H. Operating costs efficiency will remain unchanged as interest costs will not affect 
operating expenses directly.  
Figure  9 : Impact of interest rate adjustments to 
one year probability of default (2006) 
Figure 10   : Impact of interest rate 
adjustments to three years probability of 
default (2006-2008)  
We run simulations to see the impact of interest rate changes on one year and three years 
probability of default. We consider a range of interest rate changes between +100bps to 
+1000bps, which are applied to the average reference rate for year 2005 (9.6%). The 
results indicate a modest impact on probabilities of default even for large interest rate 
adjustments (Figure 9, 10). The economic explanation lies in the fact that NFC are 
financing their activity only in a small proportion through bank loans, the associated costs 
of bank indebtedness being relatively small. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was (i) to develop a model of default using firm level data for all 
Romanian NFC with bank loans, (ii) to quantify risks to financial stability stemming from 
the real sector and (iii) to provide a stress-testing framework to test the resilience of NFC 
to various macroeconomic shocks. 
A. Determinants of default:  At economy level, trade arrears, interest burden and 
receivables cash conversion cycle are the most frequent determinants of default both on 
short and long term horizon. On the short term, return on assets and short term debt 
turnover have also an influence on default, while on the long term asset turnover, 
operating expenses efficiency, debt to total assets and cash balance are specific default 
determinants. For large firms, productivity, debt to total assets, asset turnover, interest 
burden and cash ratio are key variables for estimating probability of default on the short 
term. Apart from the determinants of default identified in the model for the whole 
economy, a specific determinant of default for foreign trade firms is the share of labor 
costs to total operating costs. Usually this ratio is higher for firms involved in active 
processing business, as their competitive advantage lies in the relatively cheap labor force they can employ. Wage growth and domestic currency appreciation in the last years 
eroded this advantage, thereby deteriorating the financial position of firms involved in 
this type of business (active processing) 
B. Probability of default dynamics: At economy level, one year probability of default 
increased slightly in 2006 compared to 2005 mainly due to: (i) a deterioration in 
profitability, (ii) a slow down in short term debt turnover, (iii) an increase in interest 
burden, and (iv) a slightly higher receivables cash conversion cycle. At sector level, 
manufacturing and retail and wholesale trade firms have the lowest probability of default, 
while agriculture extractive industry and utilities have a more precarious credit risk 
profile. Large firms are more likely to default when compared to all NFC with bank 
loans. A possible explanation could be the fact that large firms usually have a higher 
negotiation power in their relationship with credit institutions, which could enable them 
to have 90 days past due bank loans payments without any consequences. Moreover some 
large firms are state owned, which may induce moral hazard situations: these firms may 
engage in less efficient activities or may have poor corporate governance policies which 
will adversely reflect on their debt servicing ability, because they know that the state will 
ultimately bail them out. Estimated probability of default for large firms increased in 
2005 relative to 2004, mainly due (i) to a drop in liquidity, while ameliorating in 2006 on 
the basis of productivity gains. The probability of default dynamics of foreign trade 
firms have slightly increased at the analyzed time horizon, mainly due to a slowdown in 
short term debt turnover and an increase in receivables cash conversion cycle 
C. Risks to financial stability: At economy level, debt at risk increased slightly in the 
timeframe 2004-2006, but remains at a moderate level. Bank loans are concentrated into 
above average risk firms, but in 2006 there was a shift in bank loans towards less risky 
firms. Effective defaulted debt ratio is much lower than the estimated debt at risk, 
pointing to the fact that the loss given default and effective exposure at default are less 
than the values
32 used in computing debt at risk. For large firms, debt at risk as a 
percentage of total bank loans decreased in 2006 after peaking in 2005. Concentration 
index indicates that bank loans to large firms are absorbed by above average risk firms. 
                                                 
32 As pointed out in the section 3.1. debt at risk is a measure of expected loss with a loss given default of 1 
and an effective exposure at default equal to outstanding bank loans amount. Despite the relative high level of large firms’ debt at risk when compared to debt at risk 
of all NFC, large firms’ effective defaulted debt stands much lower when compared to 
the effective defaulted debt at economy level. When compared to all NFC, foreign trade 
firms have a more sound financial position, which translates into lower probabilities of 
default. Firms with importing activities only, have the lowest probability of default, while 
firms doing only export business have the highest risk of default. This situation is benefic 
to financial stability as foreign trade firms absorb most of bank loans while export only 
firms have a small share of total private credit.  
D. Stress-testing: We have come up with a solution to measure the impact of interest rate 
changes on the probability of default and ultimately on financial stability. We run 
simulations by considering a range of possible interest rate adjustments between +100bps 
and +1000bps and incorporate these changes into the explanatory variables of default. 
The results indicate a modest impact on probabilities of default even for large interest rate 
adjustments. The economic explanation lies in the fact that NFC are financing their 
activity only in a small proportion through bank loans, the associated costs of bank 
indebtedness being relatively small.  Bibliography 
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 Annex 1- Financial ratios definition evaluated during model construction and the 
influence on default based on theoretical reasons 









Share of direct 




Interest burden  Interest expenses/Net sales  + 
Productivity 1 
Net sales/(Personnel 
costs+costs associated with 
third parties services) 
- 
Productivity 2  Net sales/(Personnel costs)  - 












33 Net profit/Equity  - 
Net profit margin  Net profit/Sales  - 
Equity turnover  Sales/Equity  - 
Return on assets   (EBIT-Taxes)/Total Assets  - 
Operating profit 
margin  Operating profit/Net sales  - 
Asset turnover  Net sales/Total assets  - 
Leverage/Balancesheet structure 
Debt to equity  Total debt/Equity  + 
Short term debt to 
equity  Short term debt/Equity  + 
Long term debt to 
equity  Long term debt/Equity  + 
Bank loans to equity  Bank loans/Equity  + 
Trade arrears to total 
debt  Trade arrears/Total debt  + 
Trade arrears 90 days 
past due to total debt 
Trade arrears 90 days past 
due/Total debt  + 
Short term debt 




receivables/Sales*360  + 
Inventories share  Inventories/Total assets  +/- 
Liquidity 
General liquidity  Current assets/Current liabilities  - 
Acid test 
(Current assets-
Inventories)/Current liabilities  - 
Cash ratio  Cash/Current liabilities  - 
Cash share  Cash/Total assets  - 
                                                 
33 There were companies with negative net profit and negative equity as well. In this case using the 
definition from the table ROE would be positive. In order to account for these situations, we changed the 
sign for ROE for these companies. Investment analysis 
Net investment growth 
(Fixed Assets in t1 +Depr&Amo-
Fixed Assets in t0)/Fixed Assets 
in to  - 
Fixed assets share  Fixed assets/Total assets  +/- 
Fixed Intangible assets 
share  Intangible assets/Total assets  +/- 
Fixed tangible assets 
share  Tangibe assets/Total assets  +/- 
Fixed financial assets 
share  Financial assets/Total assets  +/- 
Coverage ratios 
Interest coverage ratio  EBIT/Interest expenses  - 
Growth rates 
Sales growth  Net sales in t1/Net sales in t0  - 
Value added growth 
Value added in t1/Value added in 
t0  - 
Net profit growth  Net profit in t1/Net profit in t0  - 
Cashflow analysis 
Operational cashflow to 
assets  Operational cashflow/Total assets  - 
Operational cashflow to 
turnover  Operational cashflow/Net sales  - 
Financing cashflow to 
assets  Financing cashflow/Total assets  - 
Operational cashflow to 
total debt  Operational cashflow/Total debt  - 
Note: + means that the variable is expected to have a positive relationship to default; - 
means that the variable should be negatively related to default; +/- means that there is no 
clear relationship between the variable and default. Annex 2 – Data structure 
Number of observations and empirical default rates at sector level for all NFC 
Sector  Number of observations  1 year default rate 
(%) 
2 years default rate 
(%) 





2003  2004  2005  2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
Agriculture  1,123  1,146  1,548 8.2 4.4 3.0  11.8 7.0  …  14.3  … … 
Extractive 




Manufacturing  8,549  8,774  9,967 4.6 4.1 3.0 8.0 6.8  …  10.0  … … 
Utilities  109  105  102 2.8 4.8 1.0 6.4 4.8  …  6.4  … … 
Construction   2,088  2,106  2,903 3.8 4.5 2.9 7.8 6.8  …  9.3  … … 
Retail and 
wholsesale 











Other services  2,277  2,974  4,338 2.3 1.8 2.3 3.7 3.3  …  5.1  … … 
 
Number of observations and empirical default rates at sector level for large
34 NFC 
Sector Number  of 
observations 
1 year default rate 
(%) 
2 years default rate 
(%) 





2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003  2004  2005  2003  2004  2005 
Agriculture  32  28  23  15.6 3.6 0.0  18.8  3.6  …  21.9  … … 
Extractive 




Manufacturing  915  733  707 4.3 5.0 2.5  8.7  7.2  …  10.8  … … 
Utilities  56  59  51 0.0 3.4 0.0  3.6  3.4  …  3.6  … … 
Construction   155  113  106 2.6 8.8 2.8  9.7  11.5  …  11.0  … … 
Retail and 
wholsesale 











Other services  48  38  49 2.1 0.0 0.0  2.1  0.0  …  2.1  … … 
Total  1,394  1,143  1,135 3.6 4.6 1.9  7.8  6.3  …  9.5  … … 
 
 
                                                 
34 We considered NFC large if either turnover exceeded 50 millions euros or if they used more than 250 
employees in a given year Number of observations and empirical default rates at sector level for NFC with foreign 
trade activities
35
Sector  Number of observations  1 year default rate 
(%) 
2 years default rate 
(%) 





2003 2004 2005 2003  2004  2005  2003  2004  2005  2003  2004  2005 
Agriculture           
345  
         
393  
         






           
47  
           
43  
           




Manufacturing        
4,964  
      
4,848  
      




Utilities             
49  
           
41  
           




Construction            
653  
         
665  
         







      
4,246  
      
4,285  
      








      
1,014  
      
1,211  
      




Other services           
559  
         
593  
         




Total        
11,877  
      
12,079  
      
14,601 2.9  2.8  2.1  5.6  4.8  …  7.1 
… … 
 
                                                 
35 We considered a firm to have foreign trade activities if it either generated exports or imports in a given 
year Annex 3 – Descriptive statistics for tested variables 
 
 
2003      2004 2005
Non-defaulters Defaulters  at  1
year horizon 
  Non-defaulters Defaulters  at  1 
year horizon 
Non-defaulters Defaulters  at  1 
year horizon 
Variables 
µ  τ              µ  τ µ τ µ τ µ τ µ τ 
Expense Structure                         
Operating expenses 
efficiency  (%)  97                        18 109 32 96 17 104 25 98 19 107 29
Share of direct 
operating expenses 
(%)  24                        25 28 25 25 25 29 26 24 25 26 25
Interest burden (%)  2  3  5  5  2  3  4  5  3  4  4  5 
Productivity 1 (%)  10.4  10.4  9.2  10.7  10.0                9.3 8.3 9.1 9.3 8.6 7.7 8.0
Share of personnel 
expenses (%)  8                        9 9 10 7 8 8 9 8 8 8 9
Share of utilities 
expenses (%)  1                      2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
Profitability                         
Return on equity (%)  57  294  -13  126  40  168  1  141  25  110  -11  143 
Net profit margin (%)  3  14  -7  27  4  13  -2  18  3  14  -5  22 
Equity turnover  31.1  104.4  17.2  81.0  25.4                76.0 20.7 71.8 18.9 55.9 16.1 64.0
Return on assets (%)  10  14  2  14  10  12  4  13  9  12  2  14 
Operating profit 
margin  (%)  7                        14 1 23 7 13 4 17 6 14 1 21
Asset  turnover                          2.2 1.7 1.2 1.1 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.0
Leverage/Balance-
sheet structure 
                       
Debt to equity  13.0  50.3  11.5  51.7  11.5                40.6 13.5 48.5 9.5 32.9 9.8 36.4
Short term debt to 
equity  10.8                        42.2 10.2 48.8 8.9 31.5 11.5 41.9 7.1 24.7 8.4 30.5
Long term debt to 
equity  1.2                        5.1 1.0 5.6 1.6 6.1 1.8 7.4 1.7 6.5 1.6 7.0
Bank loans to equity  3.4  13.3  3.4  14.3                  2.7 10.3 3.6 11.8 2.5 8.9 2.9 10.82003      2004 2005
Non-defaulters  Defaulters at 1 
year horizon 
Non-defaulters Non-defaulters  Defaulters at 1 
year horizon 
Non-defaulters 
Variables  µ  τ                  µ µ τ µ µ τ µ µ τ µ
Trade arrears to total 
debt  (%)  8                        16 13 18 6 14 11 17 6 13 11 17
Trade arrears 90 
days past due to total 
debt (%)  3                        8 6 11 2 7 4 10 2 6 4 10
Short term debt 
turnover  4.3                        3.9 2.1 2.6 4.4 4.4 2.5 3.0 4.2 4.6 2.2 3.0
Receivables cash 
conversion days  65                        86 141 157 61 77 110 113 66 84 120 126
Inventories share (%)  26                        22 21 20 26 22 23 21 25 22 23 22
Liquidity                         
General liquidity  1.10                        0.87 0.88 0.72 1.12 0.99 1.02 0.98 1.23 1.24 1.04 1.17
Acid test  0.61                        0.64 0.53 0.53 0.60 0.70 0.58 0.66 0.67 0.84 0.60 0.75
Cash ratio  0.12                        0.22 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.35 0.11 0.28
Cash share   0.05                        0.08 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.09
Investment analysis                         
Net investment growth 
(%) 
…                        … … … … … … … … … … …
Fixed assets share (%)  41                        25 39 26 43 25 41 26 43 26 39 28
Fixed Intangible assets 
share (%)  0                      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fixed tangible assets 
share (%)  39                        25 38 26 42 25 39 26 42 26 38 27
Fixed financial assets 
share (%)  1                      3 1 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2
Coverage ratios                         
Interest coverage ratio  …                        … … … … … … … … … … …
Growth rates                         
Sales growth (%)  …                        … … … … … … … … … … …
Value added growth 
(%) 
…                        … … … … … … … … … … …
Net profit growth (%)  …                        … … … … … … … … … … …
Cashflow analysis                         ‘…’- means that at the 1% threshold there were still abnormal values left over (such as infinity or 0/0) in the variable, which 
prohibited from computing mean and standard deviation 
- A KS test was conducted to test for each variable whether the distribution of defaulters is different from the distribution of non-
defaulters (one-tail test) – in other words we checked to see if the variable has the expected influence on default based on economic 
reasoning (see Annex 1). In the above table each variable has a specific color which relates to a specific test outcome: 
  Variable for defaulters<Variable for non-defaulters at 99% confidence level – in 2003, 2004 and 2005 and at all default time horizons (1 
year, 2 years, 3 years) 
  Variable for defaulters>Variable for non-defaulters  at 99% confidence level – in 2003, 2004 and 2005 and at all default time horizons (1 
year, 2 years, 3 years) 
  The a priori relationship between the distribution of defaulters and non-defaulters could not be validated at the 99% confidence interval 
  Mixed evidence. For some years/default horizons the a priori relationship is validated while for other periods it doesn’t hold 
  Not applicable, as the distribution of defaulters can be greater or less than the distribution of non-defaulters, depending on the situation. 
Based on economic intuition we cannot deduce an a priori relationship between the two distributions in order to test it. 
  KS test is not conducted for these variables. After extreme values above 1% (two tail) were removed there were still abnormal values left 
over (such as infinity) 
2003      2004 2005
Non-defaulters  Defaulters at 1 
year horizon 
Non-defaulters  Non-defaulters  Defaulters at 1 
year horizon 
Non-defaulters 
Variables  µ  τ  µ  µ  τ  µ  µ  τ  µ  µ  τ  µ 
Operational cashflow to 
assets (%)  17                        24 9 25 16 24 9 23 15 24 9 25
Operational cashflow to 
turnover(%)  13                        29 14 41 13 29 11 37 14 32 13 42
Financing cashflow to 
assets (%)  30                        31 19 38 30 31 23 37 27 32 26 39
Operational cashflow to 
total debt (%)  24                        36 12 32 24 35 12 31 23 36 13 33
-Mean (µ) and standard deviation (τ) were computed after excluding extreme values (1% two tail) for each variable 
Notes:  Annex 4 – Linearity and monotony tests 
Explanatory variables vs 1 year default using financial information from year 2004 for all NFC Explanatory variables vs 3 year default using financial information from year 2003 for all NFC 
  
 Annex 5– Accuracy ratio tests 
Accuracy ratio tests on 2004-2005 data for the 1 year default model 
Variables 
 
Construction sample (2/3 of total 
observations) 
Test sample (1/3 of total observations) 
 AR  ROC  AR  ROC 
Trade arrears to 
total debt  53 77 55 77
90 days past due 
trade arrears to 
total debt  51 75 50  75
Receivables 
cash conversion 
days 31 66 36  68
Short term debt 
turnover  38 69 35 68
Return on equity  22 61 33  67
Interest burden  31 65 31  65
Asset turnover  32 66 30  65
Net profit margin  23 61 29  65
Return on assets  23 62 29  65
Operating 
cashflow to total 
debt 16 58 24  62
Operating 
expenses 
efficiency  11 55 23 61
Cfashflow to total 
assets 15 57 20  60
Cash share  23 62 19  59
Debt to total 
assets  15 57 18 59
Equity turnover  12 56 18  59
Productivity 12 56 17  59
Cash share  21 61 17  58
Financing 
cashflow to total 
assets  9 54 14 57
Operating profit 
margin 4 52 11  55
General liquidity  11 56 7  54
Operating 
cashflow to net 
sales  -1 50 -11 45
Accuracy ratio tests on 2003-2006 data for the 3 year default model 
Variables 
 
Construction sample (2/3 of total 
observations) 
Test sample (1/3 of total observations) 
 AR  ROC  AR  ROC 
90 days past due 
trade arrears to 
total debt  67 84 68  84
Trade arrears to 
total debt  52 76 50 75Short term debt 
turnover 50 75 49  74
Interest burden  37 69 36  68
Asset turnover  36 68 37  69
Receivables 
cash conversion 
days  33 66 30 65
Cash ratio  32 66 31  66
Cash share  24 62 26  63
Return on equity  23 61 25  62
Return on assets  21 60 23  61
Net profit margin  18 59 20  60
Operating 
cashflow to total 
debt  18 59 23 62
Debt to assets  16 58 14  57
Operating 
cashflow to total 
assets  14 57 16 58
Equity turnover  13 57 11  56
General liquidity  12 56 11  56
Productivity 11 56 11  56
Operating 
expenses to net 
sales 10 55 11  55
Financing 
cashflow to total 
assets  9 54 13 56
Operating profit 
margin 5 53 1  51
Operating 
cashflow to total 
assets  05 0 4  5 2Annex 6 – Model results 
Model 1 – 1 year default prediction model built using 2004-2005 dataset 
Distribution of coefficients in bootstrapping exercise based on the number of occurrences in 100 simulations 
 
Performance measures (In sample) 
 
Risks to financial stability at sector level 
  Mean probabilities of default (%)  Debt at risk_micro (% of total debt) 
Sectors  2004 2005 2006 2004  2005  2006 
Agriculture  4.6 3.5 4.1  4.7  3.4  4.3 
Extractive 
Industry  4.4 5.5 5.1  3.6  6.1  3.5 
Manufacturing  3.2 3.0 3.3  3.2  3.4  3.7 
Utilities  6.9 4.3 5.0  5.5  4.0  3.4 
Construction    3.1 3.0 3.5  4.0  4.1  4.6 
Retail and 
wholesale  trade  2.5 2.4 2.6  3.0  2.9  2.4 
Transport  3.3 3.1 3.4  4.2  3.5  3.4 communication 
and warehousing 
Other  services  4.1 3.9 4.3  9.4  11.6  10.5 
 
Model 2 – 3 year default prediction model built using 2003-2006 dataset 
 
Performance measures (in sample) 
Dynamics of 3 year probability of default at economy level 
Risks to financial stability at sector level 
  Mean probability of default  Debt at risk (% of total debt) 
Sectors  2004-2006  2005-2007 2006-2008 2004-2006 2005-2007 2006-2008 
Agriculture  11.6 10.1 11.2 11.8 10.3 12.8
Extractive  10.1 13.0 12.9 6.7 14.4 10.2Industry 
Manufacturing  8.2 8.0 8.6 8.0 9.2 9.3
Utilities  13.3 9.6 10.2 9.7 8.1 5.7
Construction   7.1 7.3 8.1 8.6 9.5  11.4
Retail and 




warehousing  9.8 9.5 9.9 9.8 9.2 9.4
Other services  10.6 10.8 11.3 22.8 25.0 25.6
 
Model 3 –1 year default prediction model for large firms built using 2003-2006 dataset 
 
Distribution of coefficients in bootstrapping exercise based on the number of occurrences in 1000 
simulations  
Model 4 –1 year default prediction model for foreign trade firms built using 2003-2006 
dataset 
Distribution of coefficients in bootstrapping exercise based on the number of occurrences in 100 
simulations  